Evaluation of Visual Attention to Images by Adults with Traumatic Brain Injury by Swanson, Sarah
  
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of Visual Attention to Images by Adults with Traumatic Brain Injury 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF  
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA 
BY 
 
 
 
 
Sarah Marie Swanson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 Under the supervision of Jessica Brown 
 
 
 
 
May 2017 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Sarah Swanson, 2017 
 
  i 
Acknowledgements 
 
First, I must express my profound appreciation for my advisor and mentor, Dr. 
Jessica Brown.  I am eternally grateful for your guidance and support throughout this 
process and my entire graduate school journey.  You continuously shared with me your 
knowledge while always pushing me to challenge myself.  Your constant encouragement 
has provided me with the confidence and inspiration to be the best learner, teacher, and 
clinician that I can be.  I am forever indebted to you for the time you invested in me. 
To my committee members, Dr. Benjamin Munson and Dr. Peggy Nelson, I 
cannot thank you enough for your commitment to serving on my thesis defense panel.  I 
am greatly appreciative of the time you invested in my education.  Your expertise and 
insight is truly cherished. 
To my parents—You taught me to be whatever I want to be.  You have always 
encouraged me to challenge myself and do what makes me happy in life.  You are my 
constant reminders of what it means to be caring, compassionate, and driven and I hope 
that I have made you proud.  This accomplishment would not be possible without you.  I 
am eternally grateful for your continuous guidance and support. 
To Cole—thank you for providing me with endless support and encouragement 
throughout my graduate school journey.  Thank you for the countless times you calmed 
me down and helped me remember the bigger picture awaiting at the end of this process.  
You have always pushed me to be the best version of myself and I am forever grateful for 
your love.   
 
  ii 
Dedication 
 
To my parents for their endless support throughout my educational journey.  I am forever 
indebted to you for your gracious sacrifices and unconditional love. 
  iii 
Abstract 
 The most common persistent symptoms following traumatic brain injury (TBI) 
include deficits in vision, cognition, and communication.  The combination of cognitive-
communication and visual impairments experienced by those with brain injury have 
detrimental effects on rehabilitation and recovery, affecting an individual’s ability to 
interpret the physical and social world and even engage in basic self-care tasks.  
Considering the widespread effects of these deficits on an individual’s daily life, 
healthcare professionals need information on implementation of visual supports in the 
rehabilitation process.  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine how 
individuals with and without TBI exhibit differences in the decision-making process, 
organizational search, processing time, and accuracy when engaging in a visual 
processing task comparing explicit and implicit information conditions. 
 Participants included 15 adults with histories of mild to severe TBI and 15 age-, 
gender-, and education-matched controls.  Participants completed a decision-making task 
where they matched picture to sentence for three conditions: (a) a condition targeting the 
main action, (b) a condition targeting a background detail, and (c) a condition targeting a 
physical or mental inference.  The researchers utilized eye-tracking hardware and 
software to track participant eye movements and analyze various eye-movement metrics.   
 Results of this study demonstrated that participants with and without TBI 
demonstrated significantly more regressions to the sentence, a higher number of 
fixations, and longer average fixation duration for the inference condition.  Furthermore, 
participants with TBI displayed significantly longer fixations for the inference condition 
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compared to controls, all of which suggest that the inference condition was more 
challenging or engaging than the explicit conditions.  Additionally, all participants 
allocated nearly the same percentage of time fixating on the target image as they did to 
viewing all three foil images collectively.  This information provides insight into how 
individuals with and without TBI make decisions. 
Rehabilitation professionals need information regarding the use of visual supports 
for individuals with TBI.  The knowledge gained from this research provides important 
information visual processing following TBI and the use of images in rehabilitation to 
support cognition and language comprehension. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Definition of TBI 
 Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined as a disruption in the normal function of 
the brain, or the presence of metabolic changes to brain tissue, caused by an external 
force (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).  Clinical signs indicating a 
disruption in brain function may include a period of decreased or lost consciousness; loss 
of memory for events directly before or after injury (i.e., retrograde and anterograde 
amnesia); neurologic deficits, including weakness, sensory loss, speech-language deficits, 
and visual disturbances; and a change in mental status at the time of injury, such as 
confusion or disorientation (Menon, Schwab, Wright, & Maas, 2010).  Additionally, 
metabolic changes noted in response to brain injury often include an increase in 
activation of proteolytic enzymes, mitochondrial injury, and an increase in the release of 
excitatory neurotransmitters--resulting in an influx of sodium and calcium into cell 
bodies eventually causing cell death (Buki & Povlishock, 2006; Meythaler, Peduzzi, 
Eleftheriou, & Novack, 2001).  Several events may create external forces substantial 
enough to cause these changes, including an object striking the head, abrupt acceleration 
and deceleration of the brain without direct contact to the skull, foreign objects 
penetrating the brain, and blast or explosion generated forces (Menon et al., 2010).  
 Approximately 2.5 million people endure a traumatic brain injury each year, 
resulting in emergency department visits, extended hospitalizations, or death (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2016); however, these numbers are acquired through 
hospital administrative data and do not account for those many individuals who forego 
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seeking medical attention. Consequently, the actual number of experienced brain injuries 
each year is likely much higher (Frieden, Houry, & Baldwin, 2015).  From 2001-2010, 
children ages zero to four had the highest rates of TBI-related emergency department 
visits, followed by adolescents age 15-19, while adults age 65 and over experienced the 
highest rates of hospitalization and death related to TBI during this time (Faul, Xu, Wald, 
& Coronado, 2010).  Falls, motor vehicle accidents, and being struck by an object are the 
most common causes of TBI.  Falls disproportionately affect those in the youngest (i.e., 
0-4) and oldest (i.e., over 65) age groups, while motor vehicle accidents most frequently 
affect those 20-24 years of age (Frieden, Houry, & Baldwin, 2015).  Blast events were 
the leading cause of TBI for military personnel during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
although it is unknown how many injuries caused by other external forces went 
undiagnosed (Chase, McMahon, & Winch, 2015).   
 An estimated 3.2 to 5.3 million Americans are currently living with long-term 
deficits or disabilities related to TBI (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).  
These deficits experienced following TBI may be transient or chronic; however, many 
individuals incurring TBI require long-term medical care due to residual symptoms.  
Common residual symptoms include problems with vision; deficits in attention, memory, 
and processing; impulsivity, disinhibition, emotional lability, depression, and anxiety 
(Parikh, Koch, & Narayan, 2007).  Many of these individuals require extended 
rehabilitation services for assistance with activities of daily living (ADLs).   
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Injury Severity and Evaluation of Cognitive Status 
 Researchers and medical professionals typically label initial injuries as either 
mild, moderate, or severe.  Several additional classification systems exist, for instance, 
those that categorize injuries based on symptomology or pathologic anatomy (Saatman et 
al., 2008).  However, it has been widely demonstrated that injury severity most accurately 
predicts patient outcomes when compared to other methods of classification (Cappa, 
Conger, & Conger, 2011). However, measures used to designate injury severity are not 
universally adopted (Perrin, et al., 2015).  Several scales have been utilized in attempt to 
accurately assign initial injury severity. 
One of these frequently used scales is the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), a measure 
of consciousness which scores a patient’s best motor, verbal, and eye opening responses 
to stimulation (Teasdale & Jennette, 1974).  GCS scores ranging from 13-15 are 
considered mild injuries, scores from 9-12 are considered moderate, and scores from 3-8 
are severe (Sherer, Struchen, Yablon, Wang, & Nick, 2008; Williams, Levin, & 
Eisenberg, 1990).  Another measure commonly used to assign initial injury severity is the 
Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), a system used to score injuries to every region of the 
body on a 6-point continuum (Gennarelli, 2006).  Injuries considered minor are given a 
grade 1, while the most severe, life-threatening injuries are graded as a 6 (Timmons et al., 
2011).  Although these scales provide standardized measures of initial severity, there are 
limitations in their accuracy.  One disadvantage in using GCS scores is the variability in 
the length of time post-injury when the score is obtained (McDonald, Togher, & Code, 
2014).  Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the subjectivity of the AIS yields low 
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inter-rater reliability, potentially limiting its validity (Ringdal et al., 2013).  For these 
reasons, researchers often look for information beyond standardized assessments of initial 
injury severity to assist in classifying an individual’s cognition and recovery post-injury.  
Duration of loss of consciousness (LOC; Young, 2009) and length of post-traumatic 
amnesia (PTA; Perrin et al., 2015) are two of these other forms of information frequently 
investigated to gain a more comprehensive picture of injury severity and current 
physical/cognitive status.   
 Loss of consciousness refers to a state of unresponsiveness and absence of arousal 
of the brain during which an individual does not follow commands, produce spontaneous 
movements, or localize to external stimuli (Liversedge & Hirsch, 2010).  A loss of 
consciousness may last anywhere from seconds to hours or days (National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, 2015) and occurs immediately following injury 
(Young, 2009).  An injury is considered mild if lost consciousness lasts less than one 
hour, moderate for a duration between one and 24 hours, and severe if lost consciousness 
spans greater than 24 hours (Fortuny, Briggs, Newcombe, Ratcliff, & Thomas, 1980).   
Posttraumatic amnesia is the condition of disorientation caused by a brain injury, 
including the loss of memory for events immediately before the injury (i.e., retrograde 
amnesia) and the inability to form new memories after the injury (i.e., anterograde 
amnesia; Perrin et al., 2015).  Emergence from PTA is a slow and steady process rather 
than an abrupt change in awareness and memory (McDonald et al., 2014).  PTA is 
considered terminated when a patient is fully oriented, aware, and able to continuously 
formulate and remember new information and events (Russell & Smith, 1961).  Injuries 
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are labeled mild if the length of PTA is less than 24 hours, moderate if PTA lasts 1 to 7 
days, and severe if the length of PTA is greater than one week (Fortuny et al., 1980).  
Mechanisms of Injury 
 Traumatic brain injury is characterized by two types of damage--that is, diffuse 
axonal injury (DAI) and focal cortical contusions (FCC; Cicerone, Levin, Malec, Stuss, 
& Whyte, 2006).  DAI is the dominant mechanism of injury in roughly 50% of TBIs 
resulting in hospital admissions in the U.S. (Meythaler, et al., 2001).  The primary 
characteristic of DAI is the presence of microscopic damage to neurons (Crooks, 1991) 
caused by shearing of axons and blood vessels throughout multiple brain structures 
(Cicerone et al., 2006).  This damage occurs as a result of both rotational and longitudinal 
acceleration/deceleration forces sustained by the brain.  Translational forces cause injury 
because different brain structures have various tissue consistencies.  When rapid linear 
acceleration/deceleration of the head occurs, certain brain structures move slower than 
others, causing compressive forces that deform brain tissue (Andriessen, Jacobs, & Vos, 
2010).  Rotational acceleration occurs when nonlinear forces cause the brain to rotate 
within the skull (Rush, 2011), resulting in stretching and tearing of neuronal axons past 
their threshold of elasticity (Meythaler et al., 2001).   
Objective measurements of injury forces often include Computed Tomography 
(CT; Parikh, Koch, & Narayan, 2007) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI; Menon et 
al., 2010), as they comprise the most sensitive modern imaging techniques to date.  The 
microscopic nature of DAI, however, leaves it essentially invisible on conventional 
imaging (Andriessen et al., 2010).  Thus, DAI is frequently diagnosed on autopsy 
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following injuries resulting in death which reveals swollen and detached axons 
throughout the brain (Povlishock, 1992).  More recently, equipment such as magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy has allowed for the detection of DAI in survivors of TBI through 
identification of metabolic changes to brain cells (van der Graaf, 2010). 
 Focal cortical contusions are caused by a direct blow to the head or strong inertial 
force causing the brain to strike against the inner surface of the skull (Cicerone et al., 
2006).  A direct blow to a focal region causes damage at the site of impact, called the 
coup.  These powerful forces may cause the brain to rebound against the skull at the point 
directly opposite that of the initial impact, called the contrecoup (Drew & Drew, 2004).  
Focal lesions generally involve the superficial layers of the cortex while the deep white 
matter remains relatively unaffected (Gentry, Godersky, & Thompson, 1988).  FCCs 
typically result in macroscopic lesions easily detectable on conventional imaging, such as 
hematomas and hemorrhages, and typically only affect limited regions of the brain 
(Andriessen et al., 2010). 
Neural Correlates 
Research has explored the brain regions implicated most frequently following 
both DAI and focal contusions.  The microscopic damage to neuronal axons occurs 
throughout the entire brain in DAI, but disproportionately affects the deep white matter in 
the frontal lobe as well as many midline subcortical structures, including the corpus 
callosum and brainstem (Gentry et al., 1988; Smith, Meaney, & Shull, 2003).  FCCs are 
more commonly seen in the lateral and anterior portions of the temporal lobe and the 
lateral or subfrontal portions of the frontal lobe, as these brain regions are housed in areas 
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more closely confined by the skull (Cicerone et al., 2006).  Additionally, the occipital is a 
common site for a contrecoup injury, considering the large number of focal injuries to the 
frontal lobe.  Although these two types of injuries are described separately, it is common 
to find both focal and diffuse damage following a singular injury mechanism (Andriessen 
et al., 2010). 
 The brain regions most frequently affected in both DAI and focal brain injuries 
correspond to anatomical structures that mediate our vision, cognition, and 
communication, a few of the most severely impaired areas of functioning following TBI 
(Cicerone et al., 2000; Greenwald, Kapoor, & Singh, 2012; McDonald, 2013).  For 
example, various portions of the frontal lobe control cognitive processes including 
sustained and selective attention, reasoning skills, and the ability to perceive and 
manipulate incoming information (Christoff et al., 2001; Stuss and Levine, 2002).  
Furthermore, aspects of the frontal, temporal, and occipital lobes manage pertinent 
cognitive-communication functions, such as understanding inferences, interpreting facial 
expressions and other visual information, and comprehending written texts (Ferstl & von 
Cramon, 2001; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Jang et al., 2013).  The remainder of 
this review will focus on the common visual, cognitive, and communication deficits 
frequently observed in TBI following damage to these brain regions. 
Visual Deficits 
Traumatic brain injury may result in residual impairments in many areas of 
functioning, including cognition, communication, and sensorimotor abilities (Greenwald 
et al., 2012).  Visual deficits are a particularly common sensorimotor impairment found 
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following TBI and can affect both visual acuity and visual perception.  In fact, it has been 
demonstrated that roughly 50% of individuals with severe TBI experience some level of 
visual perceptual deficit six months post-injury (Kersel, Marsh, Havill, & Sleigh, 2001).  
Despite this, visual impairments are often overlooked when it comes to rehabilitation for 
those with TBI, as some believe that visual problems do not negatively affect patient 
outcomes (Kerkhoff, 2000).  However, visual system impairments are a prevalent 
problem for individuals with TBI that often result in poor rehabilitation outcomes 
affecting independent mobility and daily living activities (Greenwald et al., 2012).   
 Visual System.  Our sense of vision is constructed through a multitude of 
complex pathways involving all lobes of the cortex and portions of the brainstem and 
midbrain (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  Our ability to see is dependent upon the integrity of 
the internal structures of the eye, the optic fibers as they travel through the brain, and the 
occipital cortex (Kelts, 2010).  The occipital pathway begins when light is initially 
focused as it enters the cornea (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  The light is then refocused by 
the lens and ciliary muscle onto the retina in the back of the eye (Kelts, 2010).  Retinal 
photoreceptor cells begin to process and enhance the image, subsequently sending these 
signals to the optic nerve (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  The two optic nerves (i.e., one from 
each eye) then meet at the optic chiasm where roughly half of the nerve fibers cross 
contralaterally, resulting in the left visual field to be processed by the right side of the 
brain, and vice versa (Kelts, 2010).  The nerve fibers then synapse in the lateral 
geniculate nucleus of the thalamus and continue through the optic radiation loops.  The 
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optic radiations terminate in the primary visual cortex of the occipital lobe (Hulse & 
Dudley, 2010).   
 The primary visual cortex is the location of initial visual processing (Hulse & 
Dudley, 2010).  However, this area only provides a topographic map of visual signals, it 
does not allow for their interpretation.  Purposeful identification, memory, and processing 
of visual information occurs in the visual association areas of the occipital cortex.  Nerve 
fiber projections continue from the primary visual cortex through two main pathways: the 
dorsal pathway and the ventral pathway.  The dorsal pathway, also called the “where” 
pathway, interprets motion and direction of movement, depth perception, and recognizes 
objects and faces.  The ventral pathway, or the “what” pathway, processes complex 
shapes, colors, and the angles or orientation of objects (Kelts, 2010).   
When the visual pathway is damaged, it greatly effects processing of 
environmental signals, interaction with our surroundings, and execution of daily living 
activities (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  Visual deficits may affect all aspects of life after 
injury including the rehabilitation process and safe return to independent living.  Vision 
plays a prominent role in our balance and gait, as well as our ability to maintain attention 
on tasks.  More specifically, our sense of vision is imperative in executing basic ADLs, 
such as driving, general ambulation in the home and the community, eating, dressing and 
grooming, and reading and writing (Greenwald et al., 2012).   
Visual acuity deficits.  Visual acuity deficits are a common residual symptom 
following severe TBI.  The extensive nature of the visual pathway leaves it vulnerable to 
injury.  Damage to almost any region of the brain can cause a visual deficit of some kind, 
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whether related to visual acuity or processing of information in our visual field (Hulse & 
Dudley, 2010).  Common visual acuity deficits observed in the TBI population include 
field cuts, blur, diplopia, sensitivity to light, color blindness, eyestrain, and impairments 
in oculomotor movements (Greenwald, et al., 2012; Kapoor & Ciuffreda, 2002).  Visual 
acuity deficits are a major cause of disability within the community (Berryman, 
Rasavage, & Politzer, 2010), and are often a poor prognostic indicator in outcome studies 
(Kerkhoff, 2000). 
 Visual processing deficits.  Poor visual acuity may result in the distortion or 
misrepresentation of visual information, effectively causing faulty visual processing 
(Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  Possible visual processing deficits include difficulties with 
visuospatial attention (Halterman et al., 2006), visual feature integration (Beharelle, 
Tisserand, Stuss, McIntosh, & Levine, 2011), visual neglect (Berryman et al., 2010), 
visual memory (Aginsky & Tarr, 2000), visual-spatial relations and depth perception 
(Goodrich, Kirby, Cockeham, Ingalla, & Lew, 2007), visual recognition (Kerkhoff, 
2000), and visual sequential memory (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  Impairments in visual 
processing may have a detrimental effect on our safety and engagement in activities of 
daily living (See Table 1).  Deficiencies in visual recognition and memory may hinder 
our reading comprehension or ability to recognize familiar faces, while poor visual 
sequential memory may impede our spelling or ability to remember phone numbers or 
addresses (Hulse & Dudley, 2010).  Furthermore, impaired visual-spatial relations, depth 
perception, and visual neglect may hamper our ability to locate or attend to objects in 
space, increasing the incidence of accidents (Kerkhoff, 2000).  
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Table 1. Functional symptoms following visual perceptual deficit. 
Visual Perceptual Skill Symptoms Example Activity 
Visual Discrimination -! Difficulty processing details 
-! Confusing similar words or 
objects 
Sorting laundry 
Visual Memory -! Difficulty remembering people 
-! Poor reading comprehension 
-! Difficulty visualizing from 
memory 
Remembering where 
an item was located in 
a room 
Visual-Spatial Relations -! Confusion of left/right 
-! Disorientation in space, getting 
lost 
-! Poor organization 
Telling time 
Visual Sequential 
Memory 
-! Difficulty remembering words 
-! Confusing sequence of tasks or 
directions 
-! Difficulty remembering phone 
numbers or addresses 
Following a recipe 
with correct 
ingredients 
Visual Figure Ground -! Difficulty locating objects in a 
crowded environment 
-! Overwhelmed in busy 
environment 
Finding milk in the 
grocery store 
Visual Closure -! Substituting words or numbers  
-! Difficulty completing tasks 
Filling out a check 
 
Cognitive Deficits 
Visual deficits following TBI often interact with and exacerbate the cognitive 
impairments frequently found in this population.  Cognition is broadly defined as the 
brain’s ability to encode, retrieve, analyze, and manipulate information to solve novel 
problems (Tromp & Mulder, 1991).  Cognitive processes include, but are not limited to, 
attention, memory, reasoning, problem solving, processing, and judgment (Bargmann, 
2015).  Our ability to discriminate relevant from irrelevant stimuli, comprehend and 
retain information, analyze current circumstances, and apply knowledge appropriately to 
novel situations are all mediated by our cognition (Cicerone et al., 2000).  Cognitive 
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impairments are frequently the most evident and persistent residual symptoms in 
individuals with TBI (Cicerone et al., 2000), and are one of the leading causes of 
disability following injury (Castellanos, et al., 2010).  A cognitive deficit may manifest as 
reduced productivity and speed of functioning, decreased independence during routine 
ADLs, or failure to adapt and solve novel problems (Cicerone et al., 2000).  This occurs 
due to the widespread nature of DAI causing damage to multiple brain regions that 
control our ability to engage in these activities.  Some of the most commonly impaired 
cognitive processes following TBI include attention, reasoning, problem solving, and 
information processing speed—which are each discussed below. 
 Attention.  Attention is mediated by both bottom-up and top-down processes 
(Evans et al., 2011).  Bottom-up processing refers to the tendency of certain stimulus 
features to attract attention regardless of our desire (Pinto, van der Leij, Sligte, Lamme, & 
Scholte, 2013).  The salience of stimulus item features is determined by their degree of 
difference from surrounding items.  In visual attention, the most salient features that 
attract attention include color, motion, and figure complexity (Evans et al., 2011).  
Conversely, top-down processing refers to the voluntary direction of attention to certain 
objects, spaces, or features of an item (Pinto et al., 2013).  Top-down processing is a 
combination of the ability to select and attend to certain features of a stimulus while 
inhibiting surrounding distracting information (Evans et al., 2011).  Top-down processing 
is also known as sustained attention (Pinto et al., 2013) and is required when any task is 
novel or mentally taxing (McDonald et al., 2014).  
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The ability to direct attention to a single task and ignore distracting information in 
the environment is a frequent area of impairment found in individuals with TBI (Dockree 
et al., 2006; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), especially for those 
who have suffered severe injuries (van Zomeren & van den Burg, 1985).  Attention 
deficits greatly interfere with an individual’s ability to function safely and independently, 
as daily tasks including driving and pathfinding have high cognitive-demands.  Such 
taxing activities require direction of selective focus, alternating cognitive resources to 
perform multiple tasks simultaneously, and guiding cognitive activity in a goal-oriented 
manner (Bonnelle et al., 2011).  For individuals with TBI, attention deficits may manifest 
in several ways.  Impairments in attention may result in serious motor vehicle accidents 
(Dockree et al., 2006).  These individuals may have difficulty attending to multiple tasks 
simultaneously, alternating attention between separate, distinct tasks, or carrying out 
multi-step processes (McDonald et al., 2014).  Furthermore, survivors of TBI frequently 
experience transient attentional lapses after just short periods of time, resulting in 
distractibility and task performance errors (Robertson et al., 1997).  Impaired attention 
negatively affects the ability of these individuals to integrate and understand information 
from their environment.    
 Reasoning and Problem Solving.  In addition to attentional deficits, individuals 
who have sustained TBIs often present with impairments in deductive reasoning and 
problem solving that impact their performance on daily activities (Goverover & Hinojosa, 
2002).  Deductive reasoning is defined as making logical decisions based on the 
integration of current knowledge (Wustenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012) and the ability to 
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engage in deductive reasoning directs how individuals solve problems (Leighton & 
Sternberg, 2004).  Deductive reasoning and problem solving are central cognitive 
processes and important components of intelligence (Johnson-Laird, 2010).  Success with 
these skills is achieved when an individual evaluates information, formulates hypotheses, 
and generates logical conclusions (Goverover, 2004) as well as draws upon current 
knowledge and experiences to make informed decisions (Vas, Spence, & Chapman, 
2014).  These processes are important cognitive functions for maintaining independence 
as solving novel everyday problems requires logical reasoning to determine potential 
solutions (Raven, 2000).   
 Deductive reasoning and problem solving deficits may persist for many years 
after injury despite recovery to relatively normal levels of basic intelligence (Vas et al., 
2014).  The impaired ability to engage in successful problem solving after TBI may 
explain the drastic difference between an individual’s high performance on traditional 
cognitive tests but difficulty completing complex, functional daily tasks (Vas et al., 
2014).  Individuals with TBI who exhibit reasoning and problem solving deficits 
frequently formulate disorganized plans to address problems (McDonald, 2014) 
demonstrating particular difficulty defining the problem and evaluating potential 
solutions (Hanten et al., 2011).  Additionally, survivors of TBI are often unable to modify 
their actions in response to changing circumstances (Wustenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 
2012).  Furthermore, reasoning and problem solving deficits often interact with and 
exacerbate the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits seen in this population.  ToM refers to the 
ability to recognize social cues and use these cues to understand the emotional state and 
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behaviors of others (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; Honan, McDonald, Gowland, Fisher, & 
Randall, 2015).  These deficits frequently result in impaired social problem solving.  A 
study by Moran et al. (2015) showed that adolescents with TBI were more likely to 
request adult intervention in negative social situations rather than approach the peer 
personally to work out the issue.  These deficits have the potential to impact all areas of 
independent functioning for those with TBI as they are often unable to evaluate and 
process multiple facets of information, deduce logical solutions, and modify their 
behaviors to adjust to changing circumstances--all of which are required to solve 
problems encountered daily (Raven, 2000).   
 Processing Speed.  An overarching contribution to cognitive deficits in 
individuals with TBI is processing speed impairments.  Processing speed is the rate at 
which information stored in memory is retrieved, analyzed, integrated with new 
information, and manipulated to solve problems or make conclusions (Tromp & Mulder, 
1991).  Processing speed is dependent upon working memory, which is limited in the 
amount of information an individual can process at one time (McAllister et al., 2001); if 
this limit is exceeded, task performance rate decreases (Baddeley, 1986).  This 
relationship between information load and performance rate may be used as a framework 
for understanding the difficulty individuals with TBI have executing complex tasks, as 
the demands of these tasks often exceed their cognitive resources (McDonald et al., 
2014). 
 Slowed information processing has been consistently observed in individuals with 
TBI (e.g., Kennedy, Clement, & Curtiss, 2003; Madigan, DeLuca, Diamond, 
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Tramontano, & Averill, 2000; Tromp & Mulder, 1991) and may negatively affect 
performance on several recreational and academic outcomes (Gorman, Barnes, Swank, & 
Prasa, 2016).  Processing speed impairments may affect an individual’s social 
participation, as research suggests that children who have suffered a severe TBI may have 
difficulty remaining engaged in rapidly progressing social situations (Shultz et al., 2016).  
Additionally, individuals with TBI who experience slower information processing 
demonstrate slower word decoding during reading activities, effectively reducing reading 
comprehension and fluency (Barnes, Dennis, & Wilkinson, 1999).  Processing speed 
deficits may impede an individual’s ability to participate in regular everyday activities, as 
their cognitive resources are taxed much faster by smaller amounts of incoming 
information.  
Deficits Impacting Communication 
 Cognitive-communication skills are required to engage in appropriate discourse.  
Cognitive-communication is broadly defined as the ability to apply and adapt your 
cognitive, linguistic, and social skills to everyday communicative situations and contexts 
(Kimbarow, 2011).  The term cognitive-communication was developed after numerous 
observations of communication difficulties exhibited by individuals with TBI.  
Individuals with TBI do not present with the traditional language deficits seen in people 
with aphasia (Angeleri et al., 2008), as word retrieval and syntactical abilities remain 
generally unaffected and performance on aphasia battery assessments remains within 
normal limits (McDonald, 1993).  Despite spared language abilities, individuals with TBI 
still demonstrate extreme difficulty participating in conversational interactions because 
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communication requires the perception and integration of information beyond literal 
meaning.  Potentially, the cognitive-communication deficits exhibited by individuals with 
TBI stem from impaired processing of extralinguistic and paralinguistic information 
(Angeleri et al., 2008).  Impaired recognition and integration of these extra facets of 
communication result in difficulty interpreting gestures, facial expressions, and tone to 
determine emotions, construct inferences, and find implicit meanings in both spoken and 
written modalities (Ferstl, Walther, Guthke, & Von Cramon, 2005; Green, Turner, & 
Thompson, 2004; Jackson & Moffat, 1987; Spell & Frank, 2000).  
Reading.  Reading comprehension is the process of simultaneously integrating 
novel information from text with previous knowledge (Solhberg, Griffiths, & Fickas, 
2014).  Although several models have been developed, the interactive activation (IA) 
model of reading comprehension focuses specifically on the negative impact of cognitive 
deficits on reading comprehension (Solhberg et al., 2014).  According to this model, the 
two main processes of reading comprehension are word identification and text 
comprehension (Verhoeven & Perfetti, 2008).  Word identification requires transforming 
the visual representation of the text into a semantic concept.  Comprehension then is a 
continual process of identifying new words and adding this new information to the 
interpretation of the entire text.  Text comprehension involves two layers of 
representation, the propositional layer and the situational layer.  In the propositional 
layer, the basic premise of each sentence is understood and built upon by subsequent 
sentences.  The situational layer is supplemental to the propositional layer by integrating 
prior knowledge to make inferences to construct the gist of the text (Verhoeven & 
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Perfetti, 2008).  A combination of these processes is required for successful reading 
decoding and comprehension. 
Many studies have documented the presence of reading deficits after severe TBI 
(Mathias, Bowden, Bigler, & Rosenfeld, 2007; Sohlberg et al., 2014).  However, it has 
been demonstrated that basic word recognition and encoding at the propositional level 
remains relatively intact (Chapman et al., 2006; Gamino, Chapman, & Cook, 2009), 
while the ability to integrate pre-existing knowledge to form gist-based conclusions is 
more severely affected (Gamino et al., 2009).  Reading deficits associated with severe 
TBI may have detrimental effects on independent functioning.  Impaired reading 
comprehension hinders the academic and vocational success of adults with severe TBI 
and hampers their ability to participate in leisure reading (Harvey, Hux, Scott, & Snell, 
2013).  A study by Ewing-Cobbs, Fletcher, Levin, Iovino, & Miner (2010) demonstrated 
adolescent reading comprehension scores were significantly lower for those with severe 
TBI when compared to controls, and 79% of the severe group had either failed a grade 
level or acquired special education services by the 2-year follow-up.  
Inferences.  The reading deficits experienced by individuals with TBI are often 
worsened by their impaired ability to generate inferences.  Making an inference requires 
looking past the literal meaning of a message and recognizing implicit content (Johnson 
& Turkstra, 2012).  To make an inference, one must integrate information from multiple 
sources, including verbal and visual cues, the current physical context in which the 
conversation is taking place, and general background knowledge (McDonald & Saunders, 
2005).  The listener must understand the speaker’s literal message, relate it to the context 
  19 
of conversation, and deduce the missing information that is not stated directly to 
formulate a conclusion (Johnson & Turkstra, 2012).  Inference comprehension is an 
essential component of social communication and how we understand and use language 
in specific contexts. 
 Impairments in inference comprehension and social language have been 
repeatedly demonstrated in the TBI population (e.g., Angeleri et al., 2008; Brown, Hux, 
Knollman-Porter, & Wallace, 2015; Johnson & Turkstra, 2012).  Individuals with TBI 
have been shown to exhibit impaired inference construction despite memory for specific 
details stated explicitly within a text (Gamino et al., 2009).  Because of these deficits, 
members of the TBI population have difficulty interpreting basic social constructs 
encountered daily.  These individuals have demonstrated impaired ability to understand 
sarcasm in conversation (McDonald, 2000).  Inference comprehension deficits may also 
impair an individual’s ability to interpret abstract meanings rooted in ambiguous 
commercial advertisements (Pearce, McDonald, & Coltheart, 1998) and decipher deeper 
meanings from various sources, such as paragraph-length stories (Ferstl et al., 2005), 
news, and lectures (Vas et al., 2014).  Furthermore, these deficits may result in 
inappropriate social behaviors, including abrupt topic changes and prolonged 
perseveration on conversation topics (Johnson & Turkstra, 2012).   
Emotional Perception and Theory of Mind.  Impaired inference construction 
may translate into deficits in perceiving the emotions and intentions of others.  Emotion 
perception is a vital skill contributing to understanding of conversations and the 
intentions of a communication partner.  Nonverbal communication signals convey a large 
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amount of information about an individual’s emotional state.  Such communication 
behaviors include facial expressions, gestures, body posture, and vocal intonation or 
prosody—all of these signals are imperative in conveying social information (Spell & 
Frank, 2000).  In fact, it has been demonstrated that over half of conversational 
information is conveyed through nonverbal expression (Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967).  
Research shows that appropriate interpretation and utilization of nonverbal behaviors are 
strongly related to social competence and functioning (Feldman, Philippot, & Custrini, 
1991). 
Deficits in emotion perception are frequently seen in individuals with TBI when 
examining interpretation of facial expressions (Green, Turner, & Thompson, 2004; 
Croker & McDonald, 2009), body posture (Jackson & Moffat, 1987), and vocal prosody 
(Spell & Frank, 2000).  Importantly, the perception and interpretation of these nonverbal 
signals largely contributes to our concept of Theory of Mind (ToM), an essential ability 
that allows us to interpret the thoughts, beliefs, and intentions of others (McDonald et al., 
2014).  Emotion perception and ToM deficits in the TBI population hinder social 
appropriateness and interpretation of events.  People with ToM deficits are often unable 
to identify sources of conflict in interpersonal interactions (McDonald et al., 2014), 
appropriately interpret sarcastic remarks (Channon & Crawford, 2010), understand 
complex stories in which a main character is operating under a false pretense (Bibby & 
McDonald, 2005), or predict a depicted character’s intentions (Havet-Thomassin, 
Etcharry-Bouyx, & Le Gall, 2006).  Theory of Mind deficits also help to explain the 
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difficulties exhibited by the TBI population in managing social interactions and 
maintaining social relationships (Bosco & Angeleri 2012).   
Prior Research  
The current study is follow-up of previous work done by Brown, Hux, Knollman-
Porter, and Wallace (2015).  The aims of the previous study were to determine whether 
individuals with TBI differed from individuals without TBI in their accuracy in matching 
a written sentence to the correct image from a field of four, comparing performance 
accuracy across three target categories: explicit vs. inferential information, main 
character vs. background detail, and physical vs. mental inferences.  This study found 
that individuals with TBI had significantly lower accuracy scores than individuals 
without TBI when interpreting inferential and explicit information.  However, 
interpretation of these findings was limited.  As the authors suggested, the performance 
difficulties exhibited by the TBI population may represent deficits in integrating multiple 
facets of information or attending to and processing various components of the presented 
contextually-rich images.  Without further evaluation, the cause of this disconnect is 
uncertain. 
Therefore, the current study utilizes eye-tracking technology to provide insight 
into the decision-making process of individuals with TBI when interpreting information 
through the visual modality.  Eye-tracking is a means of measuring attentional 
distribution (Blair, Watson, Walshe, & Maj, 2009); it is a method used to trace an 
individual’s eye movements as to allow the researcher to evaluate where a person is 
looking, for how long they looked there, and the order in which their eyes moved to 
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various locations (Poole & Ball, 2006).  The area at which the individual is looking is 
assumed to indicate the thought at the forefront of their cognitive processes (Just & 
Carpenter, 1976).  This assumption is the central component of the “eye-mind” theory, 
suggesting that analysis of eye movement patterns may provide an active account of 
where a person directs their attention (Poole & Ball, 2006).  By measuring certain aspects 
of eye movements, we have the potential to gather information about what information is 
being encoded and the amount of processing devoted to specific areas (Poole & Ball, 
2006).  With this information, the researchers hope to formulate conclusions about what 
features of visual stimuli modify attention and information processing.  This has the 
potential to provide insight into therapy approaches that are effective in enhancing visual 
information integration and improving comprehension of content presented visually. 
Current Study’s Purpose 
The visual system is arguably the most important sensory system needed to 
interpret the world around us.  An estimated 35% of the brain is dedicated to vision and 
visual processing, with over one million neuronal axons constructing each optic nerve 
(Kelts, 2010).  Roughly 80% of perception, cognition, and learning is mediated by the 
visual system (Hulse & Dudley, 2010) and it has been demonstrated that at least 50% of 
patients with severe TBI have a visual deficit of some kind (Kersel et al., 2001).  
Furthermore, cognitive and communication impairments are often the most persistent 
symptoms experienced during recovery from TBI (Cicerone et al., 2000).  The 
combination of visual, cognitive, and communication deficits found in the TBI 
population have detrimental effects on rehabilitation and recovery, affecting an 
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individual’s ability to interpret the physical and social world.  Visual deficits often 
heighten the effects of cognitive impairments such as memory, attention, and processing, 
as they further hinder the ability to maintain attention on tasks or remember information 
presented through the visual modality.  Visual deficits also impede reading ability, 
causing individuals to read at a slower pace, misread texts, or lose their place in the 
middle of a paragraph (Greenwald et al., 2012).  Furthermore, this combination of 
cognitive and visual impairments interferes with engagement in basic self-care tasks 
including walking, grooming, shopping, and cooking (Goodrich et al., 2007) as well as 
appropriately engaging in social interactions and interpreting implicit information 
(Johnson & Turkstra, 2012; McDonald, 2000).   
Considering the widespread effects of these deficits on an individual’s daily life, 
healthcare professionals need information on therapeutic techniques and supports that 
will serve to improve the integration and comprehension of information presented 
through the visual modality.  Therefore, the specific research objectives of this study 
were: 
1.! To determine whether adults with and without TBI differ in the decision-making 
process when analyzing and interpreting main character/action, background, and 
inferential information from given photographic stimuli.  We hypothesized that 
individuals with TBI would exhibit differences in the overall decision making 
process when analyzing images given the attention, reasoning and problem 
solving deficits associated with the TBI population.; 
  24 
2.! To determine whether adults with and without TBI differ in the organization of 
visual search when analyzing and interpreting main character/action, background, 
and inferential information from given photographic stimuli.  We hypothesized 
that individuals with TBI would display disorganized visual processing patterns 
when analyzing images given the frequency of visual acuity, visual processing, 
and attention deficits observed in the TBI population.; 
3.! To determine whether adults with and without TBI differ in the amount of 
processing time utilized when analyzing and interpreting main character/action, 
background, and inferential information from given photographic stimuli.  We 
hypothesized that adults with TBI would require increased processing time to 
complete the experiment than controls given the attention, reasoning, and 
processing speed deficits frequently observed in TBI.; 
4.! To determine whether adults with and without TBI differ in their accuracy in 
correctly identifying main character/action, background, or inferential information 
from given photographic stimuli.  We hypothesized adults with TBI would exhibit 
significantly lower accuracy scores overall than their peers when identifying 
explicit and inferential information from images given the various cognitive and 
communicative processing deficits exhibited in the TBI population.; 
5.! To determine whether adults with TBI achieve higher accuracy scores when 
identifying explicit information than when identifying inferential information 
from given photographic stimuli.  We hypothesized adults with TBI would attain 
higher accuracy scores when identifying explicit information than inferential 
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information from images given the inferencing, emotion processing, and Theory 
of Mind deficits commonly observed in individuals with TBI. 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Study participants included 15 adults with histories of TBI, 14 with severe TBI 
and one with mild TBI, and 15 healthy controls.  All participants were Native speakers of 
American English and self-reported no history of developmental deficits or cognitive 
impairments.  Participants also completed two vision screenings to ensure adequate visual 
acuity to complete the task.  These screenings are described in detail within the 
procedures.  Participants passed both vision screenings to continue to the experimental 
task.  
Participants with Traumatic Brain Injury.  The six male and nine female 
participants with TBI were between 44 and 65 years of age (M = 53.33, SD = 6.79) with 
an average of 15.6 years of education (range: 12 – 18, SD = 1.72; See Table 2).  
Participants provided information indicating details of their brain injury, therapy history, 
current living arrangements, employment status, and any visual impairments resulting 
from their accident.  A total of 10 participants with TBI reported impairments in visual 
acuity or visual processing resulting from their brain injury.  Participants also completed 
a brain injury symptom checklist indicating any chronic personality alterations, 
intellectual, psychological, physiological, or neurological impairments resulting from 
their injury.  Participants reported an average of 19.80 symptoms (range: 4 – 40, SD = 
8.31).  All participants self-reported histories of mild or severe TBI.  For purposes of this 
study, mild TBI was defined as an injury resulting in lost consciousness for less than one 
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hour and length of post-traumatic amnesia less than 24 hours; severe TBI was defined as 
a loss of consciousness for longer than 24-hours and length of PTA greater than one week 
(Fortuny et al., 1980).  
Table 2.  Demographic information for participants with TBI. 
ID Age  
(years) 
Education  
(years) 
Time post-
onset  
(years) 
Number of 
Reported 
Symptoms 
TBI1 44 18 6 12 
TBI2 65 16 10 17 
TBI3 47 16 29 27 
TBI4 53 16 28 30 
TBI5 52 14 15 19 
TBI6 48 14 9 20 
TBI7 49 16 6 17 
TBI8 54 16 10 40 
TBI9 50 18 30 4 
TBI10 61 16 29 20 
TBI11 56 14 2 24 
TBI12 44 18 1 17 
TBI13 53 12 1 19 
TBI14 59 14 2 18 
TBI15 65 16 45 13 
 
Participants with TBI completed multiple standardized assessments as a means of 
describing current cognitive-linguistic abilities.  First, participants completed the 
Cognitive Linguistic Quick Test (CLQT; Helm-Estabrooks, 2001), an assessment 
measuring attention, memory, executive function, language, and visuospatial skills 
through completion of ten tasks (e.g., confrontation naming, clock drawing, story retell, 
design memory).  The CLQT includes data for both the normative populations as well as 
adults who have experienced a brain injury.  Participants required approximately 40 
minutes to complete the assessment and achieved composite severity scores ranging from 
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3.2 to 4.0 (M = 3.85, SD = 0.26; See Table 3).  The CLQT was not used to determine 
study inclusion.   
Participants also completed the Western Aphasia Battery-Revised (WAB-R; 
Kertesz, 2006) to confirm the presence, type, and severity of their language deficits.  The 
test measures expressive and receptive language abilities on 10 subtests targeting 
spontaneous speech, auditory verbal comprehension, repetition, and naming and word 
finding.  The assessment includes data for both the normative population as well as adults 
with have experienced stroke or brain injury.  Participants required approximately 30 
minutes to complete the assessment and achieved an average aphasia quotient score of 
99.03 (range: 97.2 – 100, SD = 0.84; See Table 3).  The WAB-R was not used to 
determine study inclusion.   
Finally, participants completed the Comprehension of Written Sentences subtest 
of the Comprehensive Aphasia Test (CAT; Swinburn, Porter, & Howard, 2004).  This 
subtest served as a reading screening to ensure adequate reading comprehension skills to 
complete the experimental task and required participants to match 16 written sentences to 
a field of four pictures.  The assessment includes data for both the normative population 
as well as adults with have experienced stroke.  Participants completed the entire subtest, 
although were only required to correctly answer nine out of the first 10 to proceed to the 
experimental task.  Participants required approximately five minutes to complete the 
subtest and achieved an average score of 31.20 of 32 (range: 28 – 32, SD = 1.26; See 
Table 3).  
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Table 3.  Assessment scores for participants with TBI. 
ID WAB CAT – 
Written 
Sentences 
Subtest 
CLQT – 
Composite 
Score 
CLQT – 
Attention 
CLQT – 
Memory 
CLQT – 
Executive 
Function 
CLQT – 
Language 
CLQT – 
Visuospatial 
Skills 
TBI1 99.5 32 4 211 185 36 37 101 
TBI2 100 32 4 193 161 35 33 98 
TBI3 97.2 32 4 208 173 37 35 102 
TBI4 100 32 4 212 185 37 37 102 
TBI5 98.2 28 3.4 154 152 24 29 80 
TBI6 98 30 4 185 155 29 32 90 
TBI7 100 30 4 197 172 34 34 98 
TBI8 98.3 30 4 202 161 31 33 94 
TBI9 98.8 32 4 206 167 37 34 102 
TBI10 99.6 32 4 196 178 31 35 95 
TBI11 99.6 32 3.6 185 174 23 36 77 
TBI12 99.6 32 4 210 182 32 34 100 
TBI13 98.6 30 3.8 179 167 37 34 102 
TBI14 98.9 32 3.2 196 109 30 24 91 
TBI15 99.2 32 3.8 198 145 35 32 96 
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Participants without Traumatic Brain Injury.  The six male and nine female 
participants without TBI were between 42 and 65 years of age (M = 51.53, SD = 7.15) 
with an average of 15.73 years of education (range: 12 – 20, SD = 2.37).  Completion of 
an independent samples t-test confirmed that participant groups did not vary on age, 
t(28)=0.707, p=0.485, or education, t(28) = -0.176, p = 0.862.  Participants without TBI 
completed an eight-question neurological history form to ensure no history of a brain 
injury or any developmental language or cognitive impairments.  Participants also 
completed the Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) 
evaluating cognitive functioning through completion of 11 tasks (e.g. orientation to time 
and place, remote memory, and sentence construction).  Participants achieved an average 
score of 29.8 (range: 29 – 30, SD = 0.41); a passing score of 25 out of 30 or greater 
indicated eligibility to proceed to the experimental task.  
Table 4.  Demographic information and scores for participants without TBI. 
ID Age  
(years) 
Education  
(years) 
Mini Mental State 
Exam 
NT1 56 18 30 
NT2 57 16 30 
NT3 44 18 30 
NT4 52 14 30 
NT5 52 16 30 
NT6 65 16 29 
NT7 51 14 30 
NT8 44 18 30 
NT9 56 12 30 
NT10 42 18 30 
NT11 46 16 30 
NT12 47 12 29 
NT13 47 14 30 
NT14 49 14 30 
NT15 65 20 29 
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Materials 
 Stimuli.  The experimental materials were adopted from a previous study by 
Brown, Hux, Knollman-Porter, & Wallace (2015) and included 60 total stimulus sets 
presented on the Tobii Tx300TM eye-tracking system across three experimental conditions 
(i.e., main action sentences, background sentences, and inferential sentences).  Each 
stimulus set contained four images in a 2x2 grid with one written sentence located above 
the images (See Figure 1).  We systematically randomized the 60 stimulus sets were 
randomized into five different orders as to ensure sets with the same sentence type did 
not appear more than twice in succession.  Each participant was assigned to a 
randomization on a rotating basis (i.e., participant one was assigned to randomization 
one, and so on). 
 
Figure 1. Example main action stimulus set. 
  31 
 Written Sentences.  All sixty sentences were written in white, size 24, un-bolded 
Arial font presented against a black background.  The 60 sentences addressed both 
explicit (n = 40) and inferential (n = 20) information about the target image.  Specifically, 
20 sentences depicted the main character or action of the target image.  An example of 
this sentence type is, “The man is talking to the boy.”  Another 20 sentences addressed a 
background detail shown in the target image, such as, “The building is made of stone.”  
The final 20 sentences described a physical or mental state of the character in the target 
image.  A physical state refers to the assumed action or location of an event; a mental 
state refers to an internal belief, emotion, feeling, or desire of the main character.  An 
example of an inferred mental state is, “The man is sad about fishing in the rain;” an 
example of an inferred physical state is, “The boy is running away from home.”  
All 60 stimulus sentences were simple and active, following the subject-verb-
object word order.  An example of an active sentence is, “The boy is standing on the 
chair.”  All sentences also contained a linking verb, as in, “The boy is standing.”  The 
sentences were all four to nine words in length (M = 6.43, SD = 1.28) and written in the 
present tense.  Computation of a one-way ANOVA revealed that the sentence stimulus 
sets did not differ significantly in number of words, F(3, 56) = 2.330, p = .084.  
Images.  Experimental images included digital copies of 133 high-context 
Norman Rockwell paintings; of these, 119 comprised experimental stimuli, 12 comprised 
practice stimuli, and 2 were used for a vision screening.  High-context images are 
pictures depicting the relationship between main characters or objects and the 
environment and activity happening within the scene (Dietz, McKelvey, & Beukelman, 
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2006).  Within the 2x2 grids, one Norman Rockwell image served as the target (i.e., 
directly matched the written sentence) and the three remaining Norman Rockwell images 
served as foils.  We systematically alternated the target image location such that it 
appeared within each position on the 2x2 grid an equal number of times throughout the 
experiment.  Each individual Norman Rockwell image appeared between one and three 
times across all 60 trials; no image appeared statistically more times than any other.  A 
single image was never used as a target more than one time across all sets.  The foil 
images for each trial were systematically chosen to resemble one characteristic of the 
written sentence and followed these rules: (a) at least one foil contained a main character 
that matched the one in the target image; (b) if the object was mentioned in the written 
sentence, at least one foil contained a matching object; (c) if location was mentioned in 
written sentence, at least one foil contained a matching location; and (d) if either a 
physical or mental inference was mentioned in the written sentence, at least one foil 
contained a matching inference.   
Equipment.  The Tobii Tx300TM eye tracking hardware was used to complete the 
experimental task and present the written sentence and image sets.  The equipment 
included an eye tracking unit located below a 23-inch monitor for stimuli display.  The 
Tobii Tx300TM utilized a 300 Hz sampling rate to capture fast and subtle movements, 
such as saccades and fixations.  Fixations refer to points at which the eyes are stationary 
and processing information; saccades are movements between fixation points, during 
which no information is being encoded (Poole & Ball, 2006).  The equipment was also 
non-restrictive, allowing for head movement without compromising data.  If a participant 
  33 
momentarily moved out of the sampling area, eye tracking resumed instantly upon return.  
The power of the equipment assured that data was not compromised for participants who 
wore glasses or contacts, eye make-up, or for those with drooping eyelids. 
The Tobii Studio software program was used to analyze the eye tracking data.  
Solid colored circles appeared on each screen and each circle represented one fixation.  
The circles contained a number in the center indicating the order of the fixations and the 
circles were connected by a solid line demonstrating the visualization path.  The fixation 
filter was set to 40 milliseconds, indicating that only fixations of 40 milliseconds or 
longer appeared on each screen.  The researchers selected a 40ms fixation filter because 
individuals can encode the gist of a scene in a fixation as short as 40ms (Rayner, 2009).  
The circles ranged in size, with larger circles indicating a longer fixation time (See Figure 
3).  The program allowed for gaze replay in real time as well as manual navigation of 
each replay from start to finish, permitting visualization and analysis of any overlapping 
fixation points.  The software also provided visualization data in heat maps, indicating 
the areas of the screen each participant fixated on the most (See Figure 2).  Multiple 
pieces of information were collected on each screen: (1) the total number of fixations, (2) 
the length of each fixation, (3) the number of fixations on the target image, foil images, 
and sentence, and (4) the number of regressions back to the sentence after the initial 
reading.  
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Figure 2. Example inference stimulus set with heat map data. 
 
Figure 3. Example background stimulus set with fixation data. 
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Participants selected their answers using a four-button keypad.  The buttons on 
the keypad were rectangular and appeared in a 2x2 grid as to reflect the same 2x2 
arrangement of the pictures on each stimulus screen.  The buttons were labeled “A,” “B,” 
“C,” and “D” and the researchers visually demonstrated the correlation between the 
keypad buttons and the pictures on a sample stimulus screen to ensure comprehension of 
the relationship between the keypad buttons and images.  The buttons were large as to 
facilitate easier access and accommodate for any fine motor deficits. 
Procedures 
 Participants chose whether to complete testing, screening, and the experimental 
task in the same day or schedule a second session to complete the experiment.  The entire 
process of consenting, screening, testing, and experimental task completion took 
approximately 90 to 120 minutes.  Participants who chose to complete both sessions in 
the same day were given a 20-minute break before beginning the experiment.   
  Calibration.  After completion of standardized assessments, participants 
calibrated to the eye-tracking equipment before beginning the experimental task.  To 
calibrate, participants visually fixated on nine orange dots as they moved to various 
locations throughout the screen.  Participants were seated an appropriate distance from 
the Tobii monitor, indicated by a reading of 60 to 65cm on the Tobii Studio software.  
The software provided a calibration summary to assure participant fixations were 
accurately aligned with the target points.  Re-calibration was performed when necessary 
until fixations were on target. All participants successfully calibrated to the Tobii 
software prior to experiment completion.  
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Vision Screenings.  Participants completed two vision screenings before 
continuing to the experiment.  For the first screening, participants visually tracked nine 
X's as they moved to various locations across the monitor.  For the second screening, 
participants viewed two Norman Rockwell images and located five specific target details 
located within each image (i.e., “Point to the football”).  These images were not used in 
the experimental stimuli.  Participants achieved 100% accuracy on both vision screenings 
to move to the experimental task. 
 Practice trials.  We provided participants three practice trials to ensure 
comprehension of the experimental task.  The appearance of each practice trial screen 
mirrored that of the experimental stimuli--that is, four pictures arranged in a 2x2 grid 
with a written simple, active sentence presented above.  The practice trial sentences only 
targeted explicit, main action information. We provided both oral and written instructions 
for participants to read the written sentence and select the picture that best matched that 
sentence.  Participants selected their answers using the four-button key pad and were 
required to correctly answer all three practice trials to continue to the experimental task. 
No practice images or sentences appeared within the experimental stimulus sets.  
Experimental task.  The experimental task consisted of 60 total stimulus sets.  
Two additional screens appeared before each stimulus set to allow a short break before 
the subsequent stimulus.  First, a large green arrow with the word “Go” appeared against 
a black background.  The researcher manually controlled advancement from the “Go” 
screen participants stated they were ready for a trial to begin. Participants were 
encouraged to take breaks if needed while the “Go” screen was present.  A screen with a 
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red fixation circle in the center appeared following advancement from the “Go” screen 
and the researcher instructed participants to stare at the red fixation circle while this 
screen displayed.  Such a screen provided a common initial fixation location ensuring the 
initial viewing point did not bias any results.  This screen automatically advanced to the 
stimulus screen after a two second interval.  We provided participants an instruction 
screen detailing this sequence (See Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Participant instructions screen. 
For each stimulus screen, participants were given the same instructions as they 
were given for the practice trials (i.e., choose the picture from the 2x2 grid that best 
matches the provided written sentence).  Participants selected their answers using the 
four-button key pad.  Answer selection via button press was confirmed by the researcher 
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who observed the experiment and manually recorded participant answers to all 60 trials.  
Participants completed the experimental task without performance feedback.  The 
experimental task took approximately 20 to 25 minutes to complete.  
Data Analysis.  We obtained data for eight dependent variables: (a) accuracy for 
each condition, (b) number of total fixations, (c) average fixation time, (d) percent of 
time fixated on the sentence, (e) percent of time fixated on the target, (f) percent of time 
fixated on foils, (g) percent of time fixated on other, and (h) number of regressions to the 
sentence.  Researchers obtained data for variables (b) through (h) using the Tobii Studio 
software with a 40ms fixation filter.  The accuracy for each condition was defined as the 
number of stimulus sets in which each participant selected the correct picture.  The 
number of total fixations was defined as the number of eye gaze fixations that were 40ms 
or longer located within each stimulus set.  The average fixation time was calculated by 
dividing the total time spent on a single slide by the total number of fixations on that 
slide.  The percent of time fixated on the sentence, target, foils, and other locations were 
calculated by dividing the number of fixations on each variable by the number of total 
fixations within a single slide.  The number of regressions back to the sentence was 
defined as the number of instances in which a participant’s eyes returned to the sentence 
after they first viewed it.   
The researchers hand coded the data in effort to minimize potential inaccuracies 
caused by drift (Holmquist et al., 2011; Hornof & Halverson, 2002).  Drift refers to the 
phenomenon in which minor changes in position during the session result in less accurate 
calibration after calibration has already been performed.  Drift ordinarily produces only 
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minimal distortions of fixation location.  The researchers hand-coded data and inserted 
the fixation dot screen prior to each stimulus set to minimize the potential errors caused 
by drift.  To further assure coding accuracy, two additional trained research assistants 
each coded 15% of the participants’ data.  The researchers compared these results to their 
own, and any discrepancies in data coding were addressed through discussion between 
parties.   
RESULTS 
Accuracy 
Regardless of group, participants achieved an overall accuracy of 98.7% (range: 
90% – 100%, SD = 2.92) for stimulus sets targeting a main action, 96.7% (range: 85% – 
100%, SD = 4.01) for stimulus sets targeting a background detail, and 92.3% (range: 70% 
– 100%, SD = 7.85) for stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference.  
Participants with TBI achieved an average of 97.6% accuracy (range: 90% – 100%, SD = 
3.72) for stimulus sets targeting a main action, the highest accuracy of the three 
conditions.  Participants’ average accuracy ranged from 85% to 100% (M = 96%, SD = 
5.07) for stimulus sets targeting a background detail and from 70% to 100% (M = 
90.67%, SD = 9.98) for sets targeting a physical or mental inference.  Similarly, 
participants without TBI achieved an average of 99.67% accuracy (range: 95% – 100%, 
SD = 1.29) for sentences targeting the main action, the highest accuracy of the three 
conditions.  Participants achieved an average accuracy of 97.33% (range: 95% – 100%, 
SD = 2.58) for sentences targeting a background detail and an average accuracy of 94% 
(range: 85% – 100%, SD = 4.70) for sentences targeting a physical or mental inference.   
  40 
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for condition accuracy, F(2,56) = 17.226, p < 0.001.  
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 3.286) revealed a significant difference 
amongst accuracy between main action and inference conditions and background and 
inference conditions.  No statistically significant differences existed for the main effect of 
group, F(1,28) = 2.303, p = 0.140, or the interaction between group and condition, 
F(2,56) = 0.426, p = 0.655. 
Total Fixations 
 Irrespective of group, participants demonstrated an average of 14.3 (range: 4.85 – 
28.15, SD = 5.52) fixations for the main action condition, 15.8 (range: 6.60 – 36.35, SD = 
6.43) for the background detail condition, and 19.3 (range: 4.80 – 40.87, SD = 8.86) 
fixations for the inference condition.  Participants with TBI demonstrated the highest 
number of total fixations for stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference, 
averaging 16.98 fixations (range: 4.80 – 32.05, SD = 7.80).  For stimulus sets targeting a 
main action, participants with TBI demonstrated an average of 13.01 fixations (range: 
4.85 – 20.70, SD = 5.58); for stimulus sets targeting a background detail, participants 
demonstrated an average of 14.63 fixations (range: 6.60 – 24.15, SD = 6.24).  Similarly, 
participants without TBI demonstrated the highest number of total fixations for stimulus 
sets targeting a physical or mental inference, with an average of 21.63 fixations (range: 
11.50 – 40.70, SD = 9.50).  For stimulus sets targeting a background detail, participants 
without TBI demonstrated the second highest number of total fixations with an average 
of 16.94 fixations (range: 10.10 – 36.35, SD = 6.61).  Finally, participants without TBI 
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demonstrated the fewest number of total fixations for stimulus sets targeting the main 
action, averaging 15.46 fixations (range: 8.60 – 28.15, SD = 5.37).   
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for total number of fixations across conditions, 
F(2,56) = 21.313, p < 0.001.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 2.37) 
revealed a significant difference amongst total fixations between main action and 
inference conditions and background detail and inference conditions.  No statistically 
significant differences existed for the main effect of group, F(1,28) = 1.733, p = 0.199, or 
the interaction between group and condition, F(2,56) = 1.358, p = 0.266. 
Average Fixation Duration 
Overall, participants demonstrated an average fixation duration of 4.64 (range: 
0.22s – 1.06s, SD = 0.24) seconds for the main action condition, 4.52 (range: 0.26s – 
1.05s, SD = 0.20) seconds for the background condition, and 5.22 (range: 0.24s – 1.68s, 
SD = 0.33) seconds for the inference condition regardless of group.  Participants with 
TBI displayed the longest average fixation duration for stimulus sets targeting a physical 
or mental inference with an average of 0.69 seconds (range: 0.29s – 1.68s, SD = 0.39).  
For sets targeting a main action, participants with TBI displayed an average fixation 
duration of 0.57 seconds (range: 2.60s – 1.06s, SD = 0.26), the second longest average of 
the three conditions.  Participants with TBI demonstrated the shortest average fixation 
duration on sets targeting a background detail, averaging 0.54 seconds (range: 0.25s – 
1.05s, SD = 0.24).  Conversely, participants without TBI displayed the longest average 
fixation duration for stimulus sets targeting a background detail, ranging from 0.24 
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seconds to 0.53 seconds (M = 0.36s, SD = 0.10).  For stimulus sets targeting a main 
action, participants without TBI demonstrated an average fixation duration of 0.35 
seconds (range: 0.22s – 0.54s, SD = 0.11).  Participants without TBI displayed the 
shortest average fixation duration for stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental 
inference, averaging 0.35 seconds (range: 0.20s – 0.56s, SD = 0.11). 
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for average fixation duration across the three 
experimental conditions, F(2,56) = 4.746, p = 0.012.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s 
HSD (HSD = 0.072) revealed a significant difference between main action and inference 
conditions only.  Analysis also revealed a statistically significant difference for the 
interaction between group and condition, F(2,56) = 6.274, p = 0.003.  Post-hoc analyses 
using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 0.10) revealed a significant difference between background 
and inference conditions as well as main action and inference conditions for participants 
with TBI.  No such differences were found between conditions for participants without 
TBI.  Calculations also revealed a statistically significant difference for main effect of 
group, F(1,28) = 10.047 p = 0.004.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s LSD (LSD = 0.28) 
revealed a significant difference between groups for the inference condition only.   
Percent of Time Fixated  
Sentence.  Regardless of group, participants dedicated an average of 15.45% 
(range: 3.49% – 32.20%, SD = 0.07) of time fixating on the sentence for the main action 
condition, 15.40% (range: 6.44% – 32.13%, SD = 6.30) for the background condition, 
and 15.20% (range: 3.05% – 31.27%, SD = 6.83) for the inference condition.  Participants 
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with TBI dedicated an average of 13.77% of time (range: 3.49% – 32.20%, SD = 6.73) 
fixating on the sentence for stimulus sets targeting a main action.  Participants with TBI 
spent a lower percentage of time fixating on the sentence for stimulus sets targeting a 
physical or mental inference, averaging 12.78% (range: 3.05% – 31.27%, SD = 6.84), and 
for sets targeting a background detail, averaging 13.70% (range: 2.10% – 27.11%, SD = 
6.39).  Participants without TBI demonstrated the highest percentage of time fixating on 
the sentence for stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference, averaging 17.63% 
(range: 10.70% – 31.54%, SD = 6.10), followed by sets targeting a main action, 
averaging 17.13% (range: 5.91% – 32.18%, SD = 7.53).  Participants without TBI 
displayed the lowest percentage of time fixating on the sentence for sets targeting a 
background detail with an average of 17.11% (range: 10.59% – 31.13%, SD = 5.96).  
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed no 
statistically significant main effect for percent time fixated on the sentence across 
conditions, F(2,56) = 0.080, p = 0.923, or groups, F(1,28) = 2.841, p = 0.103.  Similarly, 
the interaction between group and condition did not reach significance, F(2,56) = 0.878, 
p = 0.421. 
Target.  Overall, participants dedicated an average of 29.65% (range: 21.79% – 
54.39%, SD = 6.33) of time fixating on the target for the main action condition, 30.43% 
(range: 21.07% – 38.17%, SD = 6.02) for the background condition, and 29.31% (range: 
21.90% – 46.11%, SD = 4.90) for the inference condition regardless of group.  
Participants with TBI dedicated an average of 30.20% of the total time fixating on the 
target image within stimulus sets targeting a main action (range: 24.58% – 54.39%, SD = 
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7.68).  This value increased for sets targeting a background detail, where participants 
with TBI allocated an average of 30.39% of the total time fixating on the target image 
(range: 21.07% – 51.47%, SD = 7.10).  Participants with TBI dedicated the highest 
percentage of time fixating on the target image within sets targeting a physical or mental 
inference, averaging 30.95% (range: 25.00% – 46.11%, SD = 5.62).  Participants without 
TBI demonstrated an average of 30.47% (range: 22.93% – 38.17%, SD = 4.96) time 
fixating on the target image within stimulus sets targeting a background detail, 29.10% 
(range: 21.79% – 36.82%, SD = 4.82) within stimulus sets targeting a main action, and 
27.67% (range: 21.90% – 32.98%, SD = 3.53) within sets targeting a physical or mental 
inference.   
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed no 
statistically significant main effect for percent time fixated on targets across conditions, 
F(2,56) = 1.299, p = 0.281, or groups, F(1,28) = 0.542, p = 0.468.  The interaction 
between groups and conditions approached, but did not reach significance, F(2,56) = 
2.826, p = 0.068. 
Foil.  Irrespective of group, participants dedicated an average of 46.83% (range: 
32.64% – 60.19%, SD = 7.90) of time fixating on the foil images for the main action 
condition, 46.31% (range: 32.96% – 53.65%, SD = 7.02) for the background condition, 
and 49.97% (range: 21.52% – 64.10%, SD = 9.19) for the inference condition.  
Participants with TBI fixated on any of the foil images for an average of 49.70% of the 
time within stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference (range: 21.52% – 
64.10%, SD = 11.22).  Participants with TBI spent a lower percentage of time fixating on 
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the foil images within stimulus sets targeting a main action, averaging 47.53% (range: 
25.96% – 55.82%, SD = 8.41), and for sets targeting a background detail, averaging 
46.98% (range: 34.10% – 54.00%, SD = 6.85).  Participants without TBI allocated an 
average of 46.13% (range: 32.64% – 60.19%, SD = 7.58) of time fixating on the foil 
images within stimulus sets targeting a main action, 45.64% (range: 32.96% – 58.55%, 
SD = 7.37) within sets targeting a background detail, and 50.24% (range: 39.07% – 
64.70%, SD = 7.00) within sets targeting a physical or mental inference.  
Calculations of a between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for percent time fixated on foils across conditions, 
F(2,56) = 8.559, p = 0.001.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 0.025) 
revealed a significant difference amongst accuracy between main action and both 
background and inference conditions.  No statistically significant differences existed for 
the main effect of group, F(1,28) = 0.070, p = 0.794, or the interaction between group 
and condition, F(2,56) = 0.668, p = 0.517. 
Other.  We recorded all fixations outside the stimulus presentation area for both 
participant groups, which we accounted for in our data analysis.  Regardless of group, 
participants dedicated an average of 7.65% (range: 0.00% – 26.07%, SD = 5.32) of time 
fixating on areas other than the sentence, target, or foil images for the main action 
condition, 7.17% (range: 2.06% – 21.86%, SD = 4.11) for the background condition, and 
5.77% (range: 0.92% – 17.74%, SD = 3.51) for the inference condition.  Participants with 
TBI dedicated an average of 6.29% (range: 0.92% – 17.74%, SD = 4.64) of the total time 
fixating on areas other than the sentence, target image, or foil images within stimulus sets 
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targeting a physical or mental inference.  This value increased for sets targeting a main 
action, where participants with TBI allocated an average of 7.98% (range: 0.00% – 
26.07%, SD = 6.07) of the total time fixating on the areas other than the sentence, target 
image, or foil images, followed by sets targeting a background detail, with an average of 
8.07% (range: 1.27% – 21.86%, SD = 5.29).  Participants without TBI demonstrated an 
average of 7.32% (range: 3.50% – 21.93%, SD = 4.65) of time fixating on areas other 
than the sentence, target image, or foil images within stimulus sets targeting a main 
action, 6.66% (range: 2.93% – 11.31%, SD = 2.28) within sets targeting a background 
detail, and 5.24% (range: 2.69% – 9.28%, SD = 1.85) within sets targeting a physical or 
mental inference.  
Sentence Regressions 
Overall, participants demonstrated an average of 0.12 (range: 0.00 – 0.80, SD = 
0.18) regressions back to the sentence for the main action condition, 0.19 (range: 0.00 – 
0.65, SD = 0.16) regressions for the background condition, and 0.24 (range: 0.00 – 0.85, 
SD = 0.24) regressions for the inference condition regardless of group.  Participants with 
TBI demonstrated the highest number of regressions back to the sentence for stimulus 
sets targeting a physical or mental inference with an average of 0.23 regressions (range: 
0.00 – 0.85, SD = 0.27).  Participants with TBI displayed the second highest number of 
regressions back to the sentence for sets targeting a background detail, averaging 0.20 
regressions (range: 0.00 – 0.65, SD = 0.18).  For sets targeting a main action, participants 
with TBI demonstrated the lowest number of regressions back to the sentence with an 
average of 0.14 regressions (range: 0.00 – 0.80, SD = 0.20).  Similarly, participants 
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without TBI displayed the highest number of regressions back to the sentence for 
stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference, averaging 0.24 regressions (range: 
0.00 – 0.65, SD = 0.21).  For sets targeting a background detail, participants without TBI 
demonstrated an average number of 0.17 regressions back to the sentence (range: 0.00 – 
0.50, SD = 0.15).  For sentences targeting a main action, participants without TBI 
displayed an average of 0.10 regressions (range: 0.00 – 0.50, SD = 0.16).   
Calculations of three between groups repeated measures 2x3 ANOVA revealed a 
statistically significant main effect for condition number of sentence regressions, F(2,56) 
= 8.785, p < 0.001.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD (HSD = 0.08) revealed a 
significant difference amongst accuracy between main action and inference conditions.  
No statistically significant differences existed for the main effect of group, F(1,28) = 
0.083, p = 0.775, or between group and condition, F(2,56) = 0.434, p = 0.650. 
DISCUSSION 
Cognitive-communication and visual impairments are the most prevalent and 
persistent symptoms noted by individuals with TBI (Cicerone et al., 2000; Greenwald et 
al., 2012; Kersel et al., 2001).  The combination of these impairments found in the TBI 
population have detrimental effects on rehabilitation as such impairments limit an 
individual’s ability to detect and interpret stimuli within their environment, as when 
reading information requiring inferential reasoning.  Furthermore, visual deficits often 
intensify the effects of cognitive impairments as they impede initial visual perception and 
processing during tasks recruiting attention and memory (Greenwald et al., 2012).  One 
example of such a task is when individuals read a text.  This process requires visual 
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acuity and processing, sustained attention, memory for previous content, and integrating 
multiple facets of information. 
Previous research performed by Brown and colleagues (2015) demonstrated the 
effects of visual and cognitive-communication deficits on the TBI population when 
participants matched a written sentence to a field of four pictures targeting explicit 
actions and details as well as mental and physical inferences.  Within this study, the 
authors reported that individuals with TBI demonstrated significantly lower accuracy 
scores when interpreting implicit and explicit information from images than individuals 
without TBI.  However, study implications were limited.  The authors were unable to 
determine whether this inaccuracy was a result of challenges with successfully 
integrating multiple pieces of information or attending to certain components of the 
presented visuographic stimuli altogether.   
Therefore, the current study incorporated the use of eye-tracking to provide a 
means of assessing how individuals with TBI visually process information that is both 
explicit and implied presented through text- and image-based modalities.  The researchers 
sought to determine whether individuals with and without histories of TBI differed in the 
decision-making process during this task, which included analysis of variables such as 
organizational search patterns and processing time.  In general, participants with and 
without TBI demonstrated significantly more regressions to the sentence, a higher 
number of fixations, and longer average fixation duration for the inference condition.  
Furthermore, participants with TBI displayed significantly longer fixations for the 
inference condition compared to controls, all of which suggest that the inference 
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condition was more challenging or engaging than the explicit conditions.  Additionally, 
all participants allocated nearly the same percentage of time fixating on the target image 
as they did to viewing all three foil images collectively.  This information provides 
insight into how individuals with and without TBI make decisions.   
Although data analysis did not reveal many group differences, these findings 
highlight important questions regarding the allocation of visual attention to various 
components of a task for individuals with and without TBI.  Specifically, analysis of 
various eye movement metrics provides insight into how much time and effort 
individuals allot to studying various areas of interest, potentially indicating what pieces 
of information are more difficult or important when processing visual information to 
make a decision.  The following sections illuminate potential reasons for the stated 
findings. 
Explicit and Implicit Language Comprehension 
 Statistical analysis revealed that participants with and without TBI demonstrated 
significantly lower accuracy scores for the inference condition when compared to both 
the main action and background conditions.  A likely explanation for this discrepancy is 
the increased language comprehension difficulty associated with inferential 
comprehension.  Specifically, according to the “high-level language hypothesis” 
(Hinchliffe, Murdoch, & Chenery, 1998), complete language competence requires 
linguistic proficiency beyond the primary level of basic language comprehension and 
includes higher order language functions to interpret inferential information (Hartley, 
1995).  Individuals achieve such levels of linguistic proficiency through the use of 
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metalinguistic and metacognitive skills.  Use of these skills during language tasks 
requires that individuals apply a combination of primary language processes, cognitive 
processes, and executive processes, including self-monitoring and social judgement, to 
interpret intended meanings (Hinchliffe et al., 1998).  The process is complex, which 
explains why interpreting inferential information is difficult.  This complexity is a 
feasible explanation for the discrepancy in accuracy for all participants for the inference 
condition.   
 Furthermore, participants with TBI, on average, were less accurate for the 
inference condition than individuals without TBI.  Although this difference did not reach 
significance, this finding is congruent with literature reporting that individuals with TBI 
exhibit difficulty with tasks that require proficiency in higher-order language processes, 
as well as cognitive and executive processes including problem solving and monitoring 
(e.g., Hinchliffe et al., 1998; Moran & Gillon, 2005).  For example, it has been widely 
documented that individuals with TBI do not demonstrate the same language difficulties 
as those associated with aphasia (Angeleri et al., 2008; McDonald, 1993); that is, 
individuals with TBI do not demonstrate impairments in understanding rule-based 
language constructs.  However, these individuals continue to demonstrate deficits in 
interpreting language constructs that go beyond comprehension of the literal meaning.  It 
is important to highlight that the language itself did not differ between conditions, only 
the implied meaning was different for the inference condition.  The fact that individuals 
with TBI demonstrated lower accuracy scores for the inference supports the notion that 
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individuals with TBI exhibit cognitive-communication impairments affecting these 
higher-order language and executive processes.  
One additional interesting finding further supports this hypothesis and elucidates 
the decreased accuracy of individuals with TBI in understanding inferential information: 
participants without TBI allocated the highest percentage of time fixating on the sentence 
within stimulus sets for the inference condition when compared to main action or 
background stimuli; conversely, individuals with TBI did not.  Although this difference 
did not reach significance, this finding is explained by evaluating the demands of the task 
and the current literature detailing the effects of brain injury on the integration of higher-
order language processes and self-awareness.  Specifically, participants evaluated high-
context images and compared these images to a written sentence to determine an 
appropriate answer selection.  High-context images are detailed pictures depicting 
relationships between main characters or objects and activities happening within the 
scene (Dietz et al., 2006).  Therefore, processing the information from these images, 
integrating it with the content of the written sentence, and ascertaining the implied 
meaning is a challenging task.  It is possible that participants without TBI realized this 
task was more difficult within the inference condition and dedicated more time to 
analyzing the content of the written sentence before making a decision.  
Conversely, it is reasonable to assert that participants without TBI did not adjust 
their performance to match the task difficulty.  Specifically, it has been demonstrated that 
individuals with TBI retain basic reading comprehension skills after brain injury 
(Chapman et al., 2006; Gamino, Chapman, & Cook, 2009), while exhibiting marked 
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difficulty forming gist-based conclusions requiring higher-level interpretation of text 
beyond the literal meaning (Gamino et al., 2009).  Furthermore, individuals with TBI 
frequently demonstrate executive function deficits in awareness and self-monitoring 
(Spikman, Boelen, Lamberts, Brouwer, & Fasotti, 2010).  Thus, the combination of 
impaired self-awareness and difficulty interpreting higher-level linguistic information is a 
plausible explanation for the difference in time allotted to reading the sentence within the 
inference condition between individuals with and without TBI.  That is, individuals with 
TBI presumably accepted the sentence content at face value, foregoing the opportunity to 
devote more time to processing the implicit linguistic information.   
Allocation of Cognitive Resources 
 Participants with and without TBI demonstrated significantly more regressions to 
the sentence within stimulus sets targeting a physical or mental inference when compared 
to sets targeting a main action.  This discrepancy may have arisen because the complexity 
associated with interpreting inferential information increases strain on available cognitive 
resources.  Research supports a hierarchical model of cognitive resource allocation, 
suggesting that the amount of effort individuals apply to any one task varies based on 
task modality and degree of difficulty (Morrison, Burnham, & Morrison, 2015).  As task 
complexity increases, processing load increases, further depleting the amount of 
cognitive resources available for application to a specific task (McAllister et al., 2001); 
this relationship is known as the resource allocation theory (McNeill, Odell, & Tseng, 
1991).  Although traditionally applied to linguistic competence resulting from aphasia, 
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the resource allocation theory may be applied to those with TBI considering the 
prominence of cognitive deficits associated with diffuse axonal brain injury.   
This theory can be used to understand why all participants demonstrated a higher 
number of regressions for the inference condition.  Specifically, comprehension of 
inferential information requires the application and integration of working memory, 
visual processing, attention, and problem solving processes.  To complete the 
experimental task, participants were required to read a sentence, hold information in their 
working memory, visually process image content, infer a physical or mental state, and 
integrate all such pieces of information to make a final decision.  It is feasible that stimuli 
within the inference condition reached a level of complexity where participants’ working 
memory resources were taxed, resulting in failure to remember precisely the content of 
the written sentence.  As a result, participants required subsequent confirmation of their 
memory for the content of the written sentence before making their answer selection.   
This behavior is surprising for individuals with TBI given the lack of cognitive 
flexibility frequently observed in this population (e.g., Heled, Hoofien, Margalit, 
Natovich, & Agranov, 2012; Niemeier, Marwitz, Lesher, Walker, & Bushnik, 2007).  
Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to change actions or thoughts according to 
varying situational demands (Canas, Antoli, Fajardo, & Salmero´n, 2005; Lezak, 2004).  
This involves numerous cognitive components and executive functions, including 
attention, monitoring, and sensorimotor input (Ionescu, 2012).  If task difficulty 
increases, individuals must exercise cognitive flexibility by compensating for that 
difficulty (i.e., by regressing to the sentence).  However, individuals with TBI typically 
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exhibit decreased cognitive flexibility; therefore, this finding is unexpected considering 
this typical characteristic of this population.  
The resource allocation theory may also be used to explain attentional capacity.  
Both participants with and without TBI allocated a portion of time fixating on locations 
other than the sentence, target image, or foil images; many of these fixations were on 
areas away from the stimulus screen and off the monitor altogether.  This observation 
suggests completion of the experimental task potentially reached the participants’ 
attentional threshold.  Individuals frequently experience attentional lapses after 
continuous engagement in a task for an extended period of time.  Furthermore, attention 
is affected by motivation such that low motivation to complete a task is associated with 
decreased attention span (Cardena, Sjostedt, & Marcusson-Clavertz, 2014).  It is likely 
that participant motivation to complete the experiment was relatively low, considering the 
repetitive and decontextualized nature of the task.  Therefore, the time participants spent 
looking at other areas within and outside the stimulus set represent transient lapses in 
attention over the course of the experiment.  Additionally, although the value was not 
significant, participants with TBI dedicated a higher percentage of time fixating on these 
other locations than individuals without TBI.  This finding is congruent with current 
literature indicating that participants with TBI demonstrate impairments in sustained 
attention (Dockree et al., 2006; Larson et al., 2011). 
 An additional interesting finding was that participants with and without TBI 
allocated nearly the same percentage of time fixating on the target image as they 
dedicated to all three foils combined; this was true for all conditions.  Although this 
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finding was not significant, it potentially provides insight into how both individuals with 
and without TBI utilize specific cognitive resources when engaging in decision-making 
tasks.  For example, two cognitive processes individuals use to make a decision include 
categorization and deductive reasoning.  Categorization refers to the ability to sort 
information or stimuli into groups to simplify the environment and reduce loads placed 
on working memory; deductive reasoning involves evaluating information and making 
inferences to draw a conclusion (Goverover, 2004).  Applying the basic concepts of these 
processes to this finding potentially provides information regarding the decision-making 
process for participants completing a visual decision-making task.   
Specifically, when making a decision, it is reasonable that participants initially 
engaged in categorization, classifying images into two groups: potential answers and 
obviously incorrect answers.  This initial categorization potentially served as a filter, 
resulting in participants ignoring the foil images that they identified as not relevant.  
Then, participants engaged in deductive reasoning to determine a single correct answer, 
during which they allocated more time to looking at the target image, evaluating all the 
current information, and drawing a conclusion.  This rationale is a reasonable explanation 
as to why participants dedicated the same amount of time fixating on the target as they 
did to all three foils, and is consistent with other literature reporting that a higher number 
of fixations on an area of interest indicates that area is of greater importance (Poole, Ball, 
& Phillips, 2004). 
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Processing Speed  
Participants with and without TBI demonstrated a significantly higher number of 
total fixations for the inference condition when compared to main action and background 
conditions, potentially indicating reduced efficiency of the visual search (Poole & Ball, 
2006).  Combined with the accuracy results, this finding supports the existing literature 
indicating that processing speed is associated with the degree of difficulty of the 
information being analyzed (Houlihan, Stelmack, & Campbell, 1998).  Interpretation of 
inferences is more difficult than comprehension of explicit facts; therefore, the higher 
number of total fixations demonstrated by both participants with and without TBI 
potentially indicates overall slower visual search and processing speed when deducing 
implied meaning from text and images.  It is probable that both individuals with and 
without TBI exhibited more fixations for the inference condition because they required a 
more extensive visual search to locate the target image, process its detailed content, and 
confirm its match to the written sentence.   
 Analysis also revealed that participants with TBI demonstrated a significantly 
longer average fixation duration than controls – specifically within the inference 
condition.  The eye-mind theory gives us a reference for interpreting these findings.  This 
theory proposes that a single fixation indicates the area to which an individual is 
dedicating their utmost attention at a specific time (Just & Carpenter, 1976).  The length 
of a single fixation potentially reveals the amount of processing resources being allocated 
to the specific area of viewing; longer fixations generally indicate the information is more 
difficult to process (Poole & Ball, 2006).  Considering this, longer fixations indicate that 
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individuals with TBI required increased time to evaluate and analyze the stimuli within 
the inferential condition than participants without TBI.  Importantly, the images within 
the inference condition were not inherently different from those in the other conditions; 
all images were detailed, colorful, and contained multiple pieces of information to study.  
Yet, despite the access to both written material and visuographic image support, 
participants with TBI still required more time to process information in the inference 
condition.  This finding is agreeable with existing literature reporting processing speed 
deficits in the TBI population (e.g., Felmingham, Baguley, & Green, 2004; Madigan, 
DeLuca, Diamond, Tramontano, & Averill, 2000; Mathias & Wheaton, 2007). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study analyzed fixation and regression patterns through the use of eye-
tracking technology to determine how individuals with and without TBI process implied 
and explicit content from images; however, several limitations exist.  One limitation is 
this study included only parametric analyses of data, which does not account for potential 
within-group variability.  Future studies may consider the use of non-parametric analyses 
to account for this variability.  Non-parametric analyses use a “rank order” of 
observations within the group rather than assuming data follows a normal distribution 
(Altman & Bland, 2009), which may be beneficial when analyzing individuals with TBI.   
The diffuse nature of traumatic brain injury inherently results in a heterogeneous group 
with a wide range of presenting characteristics, as both pre-injury personal characteristics 
and injury mechanisms affect outcomes (Corrigan et al., 2015).  The use of non-
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parametric analyses may account for this variability and potentially produce slightly 
different results. 
Second, the demands of the experimental task do not directly correlate with the 
demands of specific clinical treatment activities.  The researchers utilized simple, active 
sentences and equally contextually-rich images and asked participants to match picture to 
sentence.  An activity such as this is frequently used in various standardized assessments; 
however, generalization of findings is limited because the task does not directly inform 
specific treatment activities.  Although we can generate potential implications for how 
these variables inform clinical practice, future research may consider the use of more 
complex sentence types or real photos to enhance ecological validity.  
Third, analysis of our results did not reveal a significant difference in accuracy 
between the TBI and control groups for any conditions.  This finding differs when 
compared to the previously performed study by Brown and colleagues (2015), which 
demonstrated that participants with TBI were significantly less accurate than individuals 
without TBI in interpreting inferential and explicit information.  The lack of difference in 
accuracy is a potential consequence of the heterogeneity often noted within the TBI 
population (Corrigan et al., 2015).  To account for this, future research may consider how 
accuracy correlates with specific participant characteristics, such as age, education level, 
and time post-onset of injury.  Further analysis along these variables was not feasible 
within this study, as the small sample size would have resulted in inadequate power and 
may have contributed to type II errors in data analysis.  Investigation of these 
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characteristics in future research with larger sample sizes may highlight more significant 
differences between groups and across conditions. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 The researchers utilized eye-tracking technology to evaluate the visual attention 
of individuals with TBI when processing implicit and explicit information utilizing 
measures such as fixations and regressions.  The results of the study demonstrated that 
individuals with and without TBI demonstrated lower accuracy and required more 
processing time when processing implied content when compared to explicit information, 
suggesting that this condition was more difficult.  Furthermore, individuals spent roughly 
an equal percentage of time fixating on the target images within sets and looking at all 
three of the foil images, indicating individuals spend more time analyzing information 
that is of greater importance.  These findings have potential implications for clinicians 
who work with individuals with TBI. 
 The results of the current study provide foundational knowledge about visual 
processing following TBI and the use of supports in rehabilitation.  Clinicians may 
consider the use of contextually-rich images for assessment of language and cognition 
after TBI.  Tasks such as picture description potentially reveal valuable information about 
skills such as thought organization, attention to detail, and information synthesis of 
individuals after brain injury.  Second, clinicians may utilize images to support cognition 
and, more specifically, memory after TBI.  Incorporating real-life photos that are 
personally relevant to the individual may serve to enhance their memory for past events 
and elicit more specific, detailed language when describing these events.  Finally, images 
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may be used to enhance comprehension during various tasks.  Specifically, visuographic 
support may serve to augment auditory and reading comprehension when engaging with 
more complex material involving inferencing or integration of multiple pieces of 
information from a lengthy text.  The use of visual supports is warranted throughout the 
acute and late stages of recovery from TBI. 
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